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The Civil Investigative Demand: A
Constitutional Analysis and Model Proposal
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 28, 1980, in State ex. rel. Shriver v. Leech1 the
Court of Appeals for the Middle Section of Tennessee declared un-
constitutional the state's civil investigative demand (CID) statute.2
Judge Henry Todd, writing for the majority, held that the process
issued pursuant to the statute constituted an unreasonable search
and seizure, and that the discovery provided for by the statute vio-
lated the due process and equal protection clauses of both the
state and federal constitutions.3
The civil investigative demand is a precomplaint compulsory
process used by state or federal attorneys general to gather infor-
mation to ascertain whether any violation of law has occurred or
whether further investigation is warranted.4 The Tennessee ruling
is the latest of a number of decisions from various jurisdictions
challenging the CID on constitutional grounds. Contrary to
Shriver, however, most of these decisions have upheld the chal-
lenged demand statutes. Therefore, the Tennessee court's accept-
ance of constitutional arguments previously rejected by other
courts provides an excellent impetus for a new examination of CID
statutes. This Note first traces the initial judicial reaction to ad-
ministrative demands for information and administrative investi-
gations and delineates the constitutional requirement set forth
therein. The Note next examines the development of CIDs and
analyzes decisions upholding their constitutionality. This Note
contends that most courts either have incorrectly applied current
administrative standards to the CID or have failed to apply such
standards altogether. The analysis is broken down into six parts,
each dealing with a separate constitutional basis for a CID chal-
lenge. Because most suits that contest CIDs are based on fourth
amendment search and seizure issues, the bulk of this Note is
1. No. 79-761 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1980).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-402 (1980).
3. State ex rel Shriver v. Leech, No. 79-761, slip op. at 18 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28,
1980). The court found further that the statute's provision for contempt proceedings in the
Chancery Court did not cure these constitutional infirmities. Id.
4. Perry & Simon, The Civil Investigative Demand: New Fact-Finding Powers For
The Antitrust Division, 58 MICH. L. Rzv. 855, 855-56 (1960).
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dedicated to a discussion of this area. CIDs, however, do have util-
ity as investigative devices when proper safeguards are afforded
the demandee. Therefore, this Note concludes by presenting a pro-
posed model civil investigative demand statute designed to meet
the constitutional objections outlined herein.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Administrative Demands for Information: Oklahoma Press,
Morton Salt, and their Progeny
Administrative investigations are inquisitorial proceedings
that are designed to gather information from businesses and indi-
viduals.' Such investigations may require oral testimony under
oath, inspection of documents and records, submission of reports,
or inspections of premises.6 Two devices commonly used to compel
the production of information are the administrative subpoena7
and the civil investigative demand.8 These devices often are used
to determine whether a law is being violated or whether further
investigation or other action is warranted.9
Initially, the Supreme Court adopted a cautious approach to
administrative demands for information, particularly in light of
fourth amendment considerations. 10 For instance, in Boyd v.
United States the Court addressed the constitutionality of a rev-
enue statute1 2 authorizing a court, on motion of a government at-
5. 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 19.01, at 19-2 (1980).
6. Id. § 19.02, at 19-25 & n.1. On-site administrative inspections are discussed in Part
VII infra.
7. The authority to issue subpoenas inherently resides in the courts. 8 J. WiGMOR,
EVIDENCE § 2195 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Thus, courts originally declined to support
an agency's power to issue subpoenas. See B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, supra note 5, §
20.01 [1], at 20-3. Eventually, however, the Supreme Court abrogated this rule and held that
if an agency has subpoena authority conferred by statute, then it can validly issue subpoe-
nas. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
8. For a discussion of the historical development of the CID, see notes 39 to 45 infra
and accompanying text.
9. For a full discussion of the many purposes of administrative investigations, see B.
MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, supra note 5, § 19.01[1]-[3], at 19-42 to 19-48.
10. See Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886); FTC v. Baltimore Grain Co., 284 F. 886 (D. Md. 1922), afl'd, 267 U.S. 586 (1924).
See also 65 Ky. L.J. 168, 174-75 (1976).
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 535 (1976). Section 5 of the Act provides in part:
In all suits and proceedings other than criminal arising under any of the revenue-laws
of the United States, the attorney representing the Government, whenever, in his be-
lief, any business-book, invoice or paper, belonging to or under the control of the de-
fendant or claimant, will tend to prove any allegation made by the United States, may
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torney, to compel the production of an individual's private books
and papers. These materials could then be used as evidence against
the demandee in a proceeding to forfeit his property or to establish
criminal charges against him.i s Although the statute required the
government attorney both to specify with particularity the materi-
als sought and to state the nature of the underlying allegation, and
although it merely gave a court discretionary authority to compel
the production, the Court struck down the statute as violative of
the fourth amendment.14 The Court initially stated that compelled
production of an individual's private papers is equivalent to an ac-
tual search and seizure. Thus, the Court established that com-
pelled production "is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment
... in all cases in which search and seizure would be... ."1 After
reviewing the facts of the case, the Court held that the demand
made to the petitioner was unreasonable and therefore violated his
fourth amendment rights.1
Faced with repeated congressional authorization of precom-
plaint investigative devices, 17 and with the growing influence of
large, interrelated, and apparently anticompetitive businesses, the
Court decided two cases that are regarded as the ultimate support
for the validity of precomplaint administrative investigations. In
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling"8 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a portion of the Fair Labor Standards Act that
permitted the Wage and Hour Administrator to demand certain
make a written motion, particularly describing such book, invoice, or paper, and setting
forth the allegation which he expects to prove; and thereupon the court in which suit or
proceeding is pending may, at its discretion, issue a notice to the defendant or claimant
to produce such book, invoice, or paper in court... and if the defendant or claimant
shall fail or refuse to produce such book, invoice, or paper in obedience to such notice,
the allegations stated in the said motion shall be taken as confessed unless his failure
or refusal to produce the same shall be explained to the satisfaction of the court.
13. 116 U.S. at 622.
14. Id. at 638.
15. Id. at 622.
16. The Court stated that:
[it] is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes
the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been for-
feited by his conviction of some public offence. . . . Breaking into a house and opening
boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory
extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to
convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judg-
ment. In this regard, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.
Id. at 630.
17. 65 Ky. L.J. 168, 175 (1976).
18. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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information from businesses by issuance of a subpoena. 19 Upon re-
fusal by the demandee to obey the subpoena, the Administrator
could call upon the district courts for enforcement through their
contempt powers.20 Petitioners claimed that judicial enforcement
of the subpoenas duces tecum issued to them under the Act would
violate their fourth amendment rights by permitting the Adminis-
trator to conduct a wholesale fishing expedition in hopes of discov-
ering a Fair Labor Standards violation. Contrary to earlier hold-
ings, the Court dismissed petitioners' claim, stating that
[t]he short answer to the Fourth Amendment objections is that the records in
these cases present no question of actual search and seizure, but raise only
the question whether orders of court for the production of specified records
have been validly made; and no sufficient showing appears to justify setting
them aside.2 1
The Court emphasized in Oklahoma Press that petitioners
had misconceived the function of the fourth amendment because
they had sought total protection from investigation and not pre-
vention of an unlawful search and seizure. 2 The Court blamed this
confusion on petitioners' failure to appreciate the distinction be-
tween "constructive" and "actual" searches and seizures. Because
compulsory production of books and papers is only the equivalent
of an actual search and seizure, demandees are afforded less pro-
tection under the fourth amendment in such circumstances .2  Ac-
cording to the Court, this distinction is especially true when the
19. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 11(a); 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976) (the Act).
Section 11(a) provides in part:
The Administrator or his designated representatives may investigate and gather data
regarding the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment in any
industry subject to this chapter, and may enter and inspect such places and such
records (and make such transcriptions thereof), question such employees, and investi-
gate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary or appropri-
ate to determine whether any person has violated any provision of the chapter, or
which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.
The subpoena was issued under the authority of § 9 of the Act, which incorporated the
enforcement provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, §§ 9-10, 15 U.S.C. §§
49-50 (1976) (FTC Act). Section 9 of the FTC Act currently provides in part:
For the purposes of this subchapter the Commission, or its duly authorized agent
or agents, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination,
and the right to copy any documentary evidence of any person, partnership, or corpora-
tion being investigated or proceeded against; and the Commission shall have power to
require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of
all such documentary evidence relating to any matter under investigation.
20. 327 U.S. at 200.
21. Id. at 195.
22. Id. at 196-97.
23. Id. at 202-04.
1454
CIDS
demandee is a corporation because corporations are not entitled to
full fourth amendment protections.2" Based upon this analysis the
Court concluded that in administrative demand cases the require-
ments of the fourth amendment are met if the following conditions
are satisfied: first, that the specified materials are described with
particularity; second, that the demanding agency is authorized by
law to compel such production; and third, that the materials are
relevant.25 The Court emphasized that unlike a warrant an admin-
istrative subpoena could be issued without a showing of probable
cause and absent a pending charge against the demandee .2 The
Court, however, did acknowledge that the fourth amendment
would protect demandees from unreasonable requests. "Officious
examination can be expensive, so much so that it eats up men's
substance. It can be time consuming, clogging the processes of bus-
iness. It can become persecution when carried beyond reason. '27
Four years later, in United States v. Morton Salt Co.,2 8 the
Court cemented its holding in Oklahoma Press. In Morton Salt
respondents sought to overturn a decree of the FTC that had been
affirmed with modifications by the Seventh Circuit.29 The decree,
pursuant to a cease and desist order regarding certain pricing, pro-
ducing, and marketing practices, directed respondents to supply
the FTC with highly particularized reports showing compliance
with the order.8 0 The FTC subsequently instructed respondents to
file reports showing continued compliance. This later directive,
however, was neither encompassed within the earlier court decree
nor provided for statutorily. Information required by the subse-
quent reports included "prices, terms, and conditions of sale of
salt, together with books or compilations of freight rates used in
calculating delivered prices, price lists, and price announcements
distributed, published or employed in marketing salt from and af-
ter January 1, 1944." 1
After disposing of respondents' objections to the FTC's statu-
tory authority to compel such reports, the Court examined the
constitutionality of the administrative demand under the fourth
24. Id. at 204.
25. Id. at 208.
26. Id. at 208-09.
27. Id. at 213.
28. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
29. Id. at 635-36.
30. Id. at 636.
31. Id. at 637 (quoting the text of the FTC order).
1980] 1455
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amendment. The Court first remarked that the fourth amendment
extended to corporations and protected them not only from literal
searches and seizures but also from the "orderly taking under com-
pulsion of process." 2 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that busi-
nesses did not possess the degree of fourth amendment protection
afforded individuals."3 The Court noted that businesses, endowed
with "public attributes," have a great impact upon society in gen-
eral and derive a subsequent benefit from that impact. Further-
more, it noted that businesses are afforded the privilege of engag-
ing in interstate commerce by the federal government.3 4 Therefore,
the Court asserted that in return for this privilege businesses must
expect greater regulation than that imposed upon individuals. 5
Applying the three-part test of constitutionality set forth in
Oklahoma Press, the Court determined that the administrative de-
mand was within the statutory authority of the agency, that the
information requested was relevant, and that the documents were
described with reasonable particularity.36 Therefore, the Court up-
held the constitutionality of the demand. Like its earlier decision
in Oklahoma Press, 7 however, the Court cautioned that the ad-
ministrative inquisition may result in an abuse of power when it is
"of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly
under inquiry as to exceed the investigating power."3 8
Following the Court's decisions in Oklahoma Press and Mor-
ton Salt the modern law of administrative investigation developed
rapidly, and agencies received extensive powers to demand infor-
mation. 9 One of the developments of this modern administrative
era is the civil investigative demand. Perhaps the best known piece
32. 338 U.S. at 651-52. For support of this proposition, the Court cited the following
cases: Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 213-17 (1946); Hale v. Hen-
kel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622, 630-33 (1886). See
generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 478 (1928).
33. 338 U.S. at 652. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944). But see FTC
v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924).
34. 338 U.S. at 652.
35. Id. For support of this proposition, the Court cited the following cases: Graham v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 238-40 (1949); Steele v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 199-204, (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129-30
(1942).
36. Id. at 652-53.
37. Id. at 652. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
38. Id. "Of course, there are limits to what, in the name of reports, the Commission
may demand. Just what these limits are we do not attempt to define in the abstract." Id. at
653.
39. See B. MEzi us, J. STxMN & J. GRuFF, supra note 5, § 19.03, at 19-47 to 19-48.
1456 [Vol. 33:1451
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of CIOD legislation is the Antitrust Civil Process Act,40 enacted by
Congress in 1962. The Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice initially urged Congress to authorize the use of CIDs to ob-
tain information needed for determining whether to file a civil an-
40. Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976 as amended) (the
"ACP Act"). Section 1312 of the ACP Act provides in part:
(a) Whenever the Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, has reason to believe that any
person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material, or may
have any information, relevant to a civil antitrust investigation, he may, prior to the
institution of a civil or criminal proceeding thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be
served upon such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce
such documentary material for inspection and copying or reproduction, to answer in
writing written interrogatories, to give oral testimony concerning documentary material
or information, or to furnish any combination of such material, answers, or testimony.
Contents
(b) Each such demand shall-
(1) state the nature of-
(A) the conduct constituting the alleged antitrust violation, or
(B) the activities in preparation for a merger, acquisition, joint venture,
or similar transaction, which, if consummated, may result in an antitrust viola-
tion, which are under investigation and the provision of law applicable thereto;
(2) if it is a demand for production of documentary material-
(A) describe the class or classes of documentary material to be produced
thereunder with such definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to
be fairly identified;
(B) prescribe a return date or dates which will provide a reasonable pe-
riod of time within which the material so demanded may be assembled and
made available for inspection and copying or reproduction; and
(C) identify the custodian to whom such material shall be made availa-
ble; or
(3) if it is a demand for answers to written interrogatories-
(A) propound with definiteness and certainty the written interrogatories
to be answered;
(B) prescribe a date or dates at which time answers to written interroga-
tories shall be submitted; and
(C) identify the custodian to whom such answers shall be submitted; or
(4) if it is a demand for the giving of oral testimony-
(A) prescribe a date, time, and place at which oral testimony shall be
commenced; and
(B) identify an antitrust investigator who shall conduct the examination
and the custodian to whom the transcript of such examination shall be
submitted.
Enforcement of the demand is provided for by § 1314, which states in part:
(a) Whenever any person fails to comply with any civil investigative demand duly
served upon him under section 1312 of this title or whenever satisfactory copying or
reproduction of any such material cannot be done and such person refuses to surrender
such material, the Attorney General, through such officers of attorneys as he may des-
ignate, may file, in the district court of the United States for any judicial district in
which such person resides, is found, or transacts business, and serve upon such person
a petition for an order of such court for the enforcement of this chapter.
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titrust complaint.41 Following the ACP Act, an overwhelming ma-
jority of the states passed legislation authorizing the issuance of a
CID or its functional equivalent by the state attorney general or
other official.42 A number of these statutes are limited in scope to
an inquiry of specified alleged offenses, primarily antitrust or con-
sumer protection violations.43 Other CID statutes, however, have
little or no specification as to the type of inquiry or alleged offense
that must be involved. Most striking in this category is the Ten-
nessee CID statute recently invalidated in State ex rel. Shriver v.
Leech." Challenges to these new statutes resulted in a number of
federal and state decisions that upheld their constitutional validity
on the basis of Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt.45
In Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Co.46 petitioner challenged a
demand issued to it pursuant to the ACP Act, claiming, among
41. For a full discussion of the history of the ACP Act, see Perry & Simon, supra note
4. See also 37 WASH. L. REv. 278 (1962).
42. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.495 (Supp. 1979); AR!z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1524 (Supp.
1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-909 (1979); COL. REV. STAT. § 6-1-107 (Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 42-110d (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2514 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.206
(West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 106-1213 (Supp. 1980); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 487-9
(1976); IDAHO CODE § 48-611 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-9-4 (Burns); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-631 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. §
367.240 (Supp. 1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51-144 (West 1965); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 211 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 26B (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 6
(West 1972); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 445.907 (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.907 (West
Supp. 1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-17 (Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.040 (Vernon
1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 82-15-204 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1611 (1978); NEv.
REV. STAT. § 598A-100 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 356:10 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:8-3 (West Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-5 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-10 (1975); N.D. CENr. CODE § 51-15-04
(1974); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.06 (Page 1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 646.618 (1979); 73-74
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-6 (Purdon 1971) (deleted 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-7
(Supp. 1979); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 37-24-12 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-402 (1980);
Thx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.61 (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-
16 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2460 (Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 59.1-9.10 (Supp.
1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.110 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 46A-7-104 (1976); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 426.106 (West 1974); Wyo. STAT. § 40-3-111 (1977).
43. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-909 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7.2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1980).
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-402 (1980); State ex rel. Shriver v. Leech, No. 79-761
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1980). TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-401 (1980) provides in part:
The attorney general and reporter, in performing the duties of his office where the
state of Tennessee is a party litigant or there is reasonable cause to indicate it will be a
party litigant is hereby empowered to require any person to testify under oath as to
any matter which is a proper subject of inquiry by the attorney general and reporter.
45. For a discussion of several of these cases dealing with the ACP Act, see Annot., 10
A.L.R. FED. 677, 694-702 (1972). See also 65 Ky. L.J. 168, 178-79 n.56 (1976).
46. 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), afl'd, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964).
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other things, that the demand violated its fourth amendment
rights. The court initially traced the reasons for the existence of
the precomplaint investigatory procedure found in the ACP Act,
noting that prior to the passage of the CID statute the Justice De-
partment had four methods of obtaining information upon which
to base a complaint. These methods were as follows: first, volun-
tary compliance by the target of the investigation; second, use of a
subpoena duces tecum issued by a grand jury; third, transfer of
information obtained by the FTC; and last, utilization of discovery
proceedings upon filing of a skeletal complaint.47 For a variety of
reasons, however, these methods proved undesirable.4 8 In particu-
lar, the court noted that the Supreme Court had held that use of a
grand jury with no intent to bring a criminal action constituted an
abuse of process.4 9 The court concluded its review of these prior
methods by declaring that Congress designed the ACP Act to rem-
edy this lack of efficient and satisfactory investigatory technique
by providing the Justice Department with independent authority
to obtain information."
Turning to petitioner's fourth amendment objections, the
court reviewed the reasoning of Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt.
The court recognized that the CID "constitutes an innovation in
the civil investigative powers of the Attorney General." 1 Despite
the novel nature of the CID, however, the court concluded that the
Supreme Court's sanctioning of "sweeping investigative powers"
for administrative bodies in Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt er-
ected "guideposts" for examining the constitutionality of CID stat-
utes.2 The court rejected the contention that the demand consti-
tuted an impermissible "fishing expedition"; instead, it reasoned
that the civil investigative demand process was comparable to a
grand jury proceeding because in both situations the possibility of
a violation has sparked the investigation. Thus, the court con-
cluded that based upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the
area of administrative demands the provisions of the ACP Act au-
47. Id. at 393.
48. Id. Not surprisingly, voluntary compliance by the target of the investigation did
not arise frequently. Also, attempts to obtain information in the hands of the FTC resulted
in an inefficient use of personnel. Similarly, the use of discovery rules proved undesirable
"because it was felt that it was unfair to resort to such a practice without any certainty that
sufficient evidence existed to warrant a civil suit." Id.
49. Id. at 393 (citing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958)).
50. 221 F. Supp. at 393.




thorizing civil investigative demands were constitutional."
In addition to the Gold Bond court's approval of the Justice
Department's investigative powers, several state court decisions
have upheld the validity of their respective CID statutes. For ex-
ample, in Steele v. Washington54 the Washington attorney general
served a CID upon the operators of an employment agency pursu-
ant to his powers granted under the Washington Consumer Protec-
tion Act.5 Citing Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt, the court held
that businesses are afforded less fourth amendment protection
than individuals, and that a CID issued to a corporation would be
upheld if it met the three-part test of Oklahoma Press.56 Finding
that the inquiry at issue was within the authority of the attorney
general, the demand was not too indefinite, and the information
sought was reasonably relevant, the court sustained the issuance of
the CID.57
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Pineur5s a representative of a
corporate seller of mobile homes sought protective relief from a
CID served upon him by the Kentucky attorney general pursuant
to the state's Consumer Protection Act.59 The court upheld the
CID in question, rejecting the representative's claim that the attor-
ney general should be required to make a showing on the face of
the demand that the grounds for issuance were reasonable.60 The
court relied heavily on the reasoning of Morton Salt in concluding
that the instant statute met "[t]he constitutional requirements ap-
plicable to this kind of an investigatory process .... 81
Finally, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Killian"2 plaintiff sought to
quash a subpoena duces tecum served on it under the Connecticut
Anti-Trust Act63 during the course of an investigation into alleged
53. Id. For other decisions on the ACP Act, see Amateur Softball Ass'n v. United
States, 467 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1972); Lightning Rod Mfrs. Ass'n v. Staal, 339 F.2d 346 (7th
Cir. 1964); Hyster Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1964); Petition of Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 235 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also Annot., 10 A.L.R. FED.
677 (1972).
54. 85 Wash. 2d 585, 537 P.2d 782 (1975).
55. Id. at 586, 537 P.2d at 784.
56. Id. at 593, 537 P.2d at 787.
57. Id. at 595, 537 P.2d at 788.
58. 533 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1976).
59. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 367.110-.300 (Supp. 1980).
60. 533 S.W.2d at 530.
61. Id. at 528.
62. 30 Conn. Supp. 87, 301 A.2d 562 (1973).
63. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-24 to -45 (1979).
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gasoline price-fixing."4 The court refused to grant such relief under
the reasoning of Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt.5 Significantly,
the court stated that "the Connecticut statute, like the federal act
[ACP Act], has virtually eliminated the 'no fishing' signs where
civil subpoenas [served] under its aegis are issued." ' This view ex-
pressed in Mobil Oil reflects the current "hands-off' position of
many state courts, a view unjustified by even the broad language of
Oklahoma Press.6
7
B. The Administrative Search Warrant Cases
Beginning in 1967 with Camara v. Municipal Court68 and See
v. City of Seattle" the Supreme Court handed down a series of
decisions70 that collectively stand for the proposition that adminis-
trative searches must comply with the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment. It is not the purpose of this Note to provide a
detailed analysis of these cases. A wealth of scholarly material is
readily available in the area. 1 An overview of these decisions, how-
ever, is necessary for a fuller understanding of the fourth amend-
ment's application to the civil investigative demand.
In Camara appellant was charged with a criminal violation of
the San Francisco Housing Code when he refused to permit a war-
rantless inspection of his residence.7 Appellant claimed that the
ordinance, which authorized municipal officials to conduct searches
64. 30 Conn. Supp. at 88-89, 301 A.2d at 563.
65. Id. at 95, 301 A.2d at 567.
66. Id.
67. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
68. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
69. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
70. In addition to Camara and See the Court decided a number of subsequent cases in
an attempt to define the parameters of the fourth amendment in the area of administrative
searches. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
71. These cases resulted in a veritable flood of articles discussing the merits of the
respective holdings. An abridged list of the more recent of these articles includes the follow-
ing: McManis & McManis, Structuring Administrative Inspections: Is There Any Warrant
for a Search Warrant?, 26 Am. U.L. Rlv. 942 (1977); Note, Administrative Searches and
the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
856 (1979); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Are Warrantless Routine OSHA Inspections a
Violation of the Fourth Amendment?, 6 ENVT'L AFF. 423 (1978); Note, Searches by Admin-
istrative Agencies After Barlow's and Tyler: Fourth Amendment Pitfalls and Short-Cuts,
14 LAND & WATER L. REV. 207 (1979); 16 Hous. L. REv. 399 (1979); 57 N.C. L. REv. 320
(1979); 46 TENN. L. Rlv. 446 (1979); 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 231 (1979); 18 WASHBURN L.J. 325
(1979).
72. 387 U.S. at 525.
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of private dwellings without a search warrant and without probable
cause of a housing code violation, violated his fourth amendment
right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure.73 The
Court, reversing its earlier position in Frank v. Maryland" and
Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price,75 held the San Francisco ordinance un-
constitutional because it did not require the prior issuance of a
search warrant.7 8 In broad language the Court noted that the basic
purpose of the fourth amendment is to "safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials. '7 7 While acknowledging the difficulty of stating with pre-
cision what constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in any
given case, the Court nevertheless declared that "one governing
principle, justified by history and by current experience, has con-
sistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes
of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search war-
rant. 7 8 The Court rejected the contention that the fourth amend-
ment protected only those individuals suspected of criminal behav-
ior.79 Finally, the Court refused to accept appellee's argument that
built-in statutory safeguards could substitute for prior individual-
ized judicial review of the administrative search procedure. 80 The
Court closed its discussion of the fourth amendment challenge by
restating the necessity of a finding of "probable cause" before a
search warrant could issue. Importantly, the Court cited Oklahoma
Press as authority for the position that "[i]f a valid public interest
justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause
to issue a suitably restricted search warrant." 81
See, decided the same day as Camara, involved the conviction
of an individual for violation of the Seattle Fire Code.82 The ordi-
nance authorized the fire chief to conduct inspections of all build-
ings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, in order to as-
sure compliance with the various fire and safety codes." Appellant
73. Id. at 527.
74. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
75. 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
76. 387 U.S. at 528.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 528-29.
79. Id. at 530.
80. Id. at 533.
81. Id. at 539.
82. Id. at 541.
83. Id.
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had been convicted for refusing the fire inspector access to his
commercial warehouse without a warrant, but the Court reversed
the conviction on the basis of its holding in Camara. The Court
initially noted that "[t]he only question which this case presents is
whether Camara applies to similar inspections of commercial
structures which are not used as private residences."8 The Court
then answered the question in the affirmative, declaring that "[t]he
businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional
right to go about his business free from unreasonable official en-
tries upon his private commercial property. 8 5 This right, the
Court concluded, is jeopardized by warrantless administrative
inspections."8
The Court in See found support in the administrative sub-
poena cases for its holding that warrants are required for an ad-
ministrative search. 7 Initially restating the three-part Oklahoma
Press standard of limited scope, relevant purpose, and specificity,
the Court acknowledged the power of an administrative agency to
conduct all document inspections authorized by statute, provided
the agency limited the scope of the search by designating the docu-
ments needed in a formal subpoena.88 In addition to these require-
ments, the Court stressed that an administrative subpoena must
issue from the agency and not the field inspector, and that the sub-
poenaed party is entitled to judicial review of the reasonableness of
the demand prior to imposition of any penalties for noncompli-
ance.8 The Court thus reasoned that
[gliven the analogous investigative functions performed by the administrative
subpoena and the demand for entry, we find untenable the proposition that
the subpoena, which has been termed a "constructive" search ... is subject
to Fourth Amendment limitations which do not apply to actual searches and
inspections of commercial premises.' 0
84. Id. at 542.
85. Id. at 543.
86. Id. The Court further stated that "we see no justification for so relaxing Fourth
Amendment safeguards where the official inspection is intended to aid enforcement of laws
prescribing minimum physical standards for commercial premises." Id.
87. Id. at 544. The Court declared:
[W]e have dealt with the Fourth Amendment issues raised by another common investi-
gative technique, the administrative subpoena of corporate books and records. We find
strong support in these subpoena cases for our conclusion that warrants are a necessary
and a tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and inspect commercial premises.
Id. See notes 18-38 supra and accompanying text.
88. 387 U.S. at 544.
89. Id. at 544-45.
90. Id. at 545.
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Based upon this reasoning, the Court concluded that "the basic
component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amend-
ment-that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant proce-
dure-is applicable in this context... ."'I Thus, the See opinion
not only clarified the law as to administrative inspections, but also
vocalized the unspoken assumption of Oklahoma Press-that a de-
mandee is entitled to judicial review prior to enforcement of an
administrative demand for documents or testimony.
Following Camara and See, the Court decided a series of cases
in an attempt to clarify its holding on administrative searches. In
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States12 and United States v.
Biswell9" the Court retreated from its position in See and author-
ized a warrantless inspection of two commercial premises. In Col-
onnade IRS agents broke the lock to a liquor storeroom and en-
tered without a warrant when refused entrance by the liquor store
owner." In Biswell a policeman and an agent of the Treasury De-
partment entered and inspected a pawn shop for unlicensed fire-
arms without a warrant.95 In both cases the Court upheld the war-
rantless searches. The Court stated that because the owners
operated businesses "long subject to close supervision and inspec-
tion"" they had only a slight expectation of privacy in their prem-
ises,97 and that, therefore, a warrantless regulatory inspection did
not violate their fourth amendment rights.
The Court laid to rest any notion that Colonnade and Biswell
had destroyed the vitality of the warrant requirement in adminis-
trative searches in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.8 In Marshall agents
of the Labor Department conducted a warrantless search of appel-
lee's electrical and plumbing installation business for OSHA viola-
tions.99 Stating that the nature of the charge-civil or crimi-
nal-was irrelevant, the Court held that such a warrantless search
violated the standards of the fourth amendment as set forth in
Camara and See.1°0 The Secretary of Labor had urged the Court to
91. Id. at 546.
92. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
93. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
94. 397 U.S. at 72-73.
95. 406 U.S. at 311-13.
96. 397 U.S. at 77.
97. 406 U.S. at 316.
98. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
99. Id. at 309-10.
100. Id. at 323-24. The Court concluded that "[t]he general warrant was a recurring
point of contention in the Colonies immediately preceding the Revolution. The particular
1464 [Vol. 33:1451
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grant OSHA an exception from the warrant requirement similar to
the closely regulated business exception of Colonnade and Bis-
well.10 1 The Court acknowledged that exception, but refused to ex-
tend it beyond its current reach.102 The Court, however, did de-
clare that the warrant might issue upon a lesser showing of
probable cause, i.e., that reasonable administrative standards for
conducting an inspection of a particular business had been met,
rather than probable cause to believe that a violation existed at the
establishment.103
Finally, in Michigan v. Tyler 04 the Court announced an addi-
tional exception to the warrant requirement. In that case, fire in-
spectors, without a warrant, had entered a burned building imme-
diately after dousing the fire and several times thereafter to check
for arson. The Court declared that no warrant was necessary to
inspect in emergency situations and that immediate inspection of a
burned building constituted such an emergency.105 The Court,
however, determined that the subsequent inspections had occurred
longer than a "reasonable" time after the fire had ended, and that
therefore a warrant was required for those inspections. 10 6
C. Analysis
Based on the preceding review of relevant case law in the area
offensiveness it engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose prem-
ises and products were inspected for compliance with the several parliamentary revenue
measures that most irritated the colonists." Id. at 311 (footnotes omitted).
101. Id. at 313.
102. Id.
These cases are indeed exceptions, but they represent responses to relatively unique
circumstances. Certain industries have such a history of government oversight that no
reasonable expectation of privacy, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52
(1967), could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise. Liquor (Colon-
nade) and firearms (Biswell) are industries of this type; when an entrepreneur embarks
upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of
governmental regulation.
Id.
103. Id. at 320. The Court disagreed that such a standard provided only incidental
protection, asserting that
[a] warrant. . . would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is
reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an ad-
ministrative plan containing specific neutral criteria. Also, a warrant would then and
there advise the owner of the scope and objects of the search, beyond which limits the
inspector is not expected to proceed.
Id. at 323 (footnotes omitted).
104. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
105. Id. at 509.
106. Id. at 510-11.
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of administrative investigations, two conclusions may be drawn.
First, as to administrative inspections, the fourth amendment af-
fords individuals and businesses facing administrative inspections
the following protection: a warrant must issue for on-site civil or
criminal inspections, absent a showing that the business is closely
regulated or that an emergency exists.107 Second, as to administra-
tive demands for information, the fourth amendment affords indi-
viduals, and to a lesser degree businesses, the following protection:
a demand for information must comply with statutory require-
ments, be limited in scope, seek relevant material, describe that
material with particularity, and be enforced only after judicial re-
view.108 Drawing upon the foregoing conclusions and accompanying
analysis, this Note will now examine fourth amendment objections
to CID statutes from several standpoints.
1. Prior Judicial Review: Timing and Notice
As noted above, judicial review of the reasonableness of a de-
mand is required prior to enforcement for both informational de-
mands and on-site inspections. While many CID statutes,109 most
notably the ACP Act,110 do contain provisions for judicial review
prior to enforcement or punishment for noncompliance, the degree
to which others afford such an opportunity to the demandee is un-
clear."11 For example, the Tennessee CID statute provides judicial
review only in the form of a contempt proceeding initiated by the
attorney general. Furthermore, the statute provides that the
"chancery court shall exercise the authority granted it by law in
the treating of contempt. . . all to the end that the witness shall
be compelled to appear to give testimony at the time and place
specified by the chancery court. '112 Although adequate judicial re-
107. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Mun.
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See generally South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976);
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
108. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). See also General
Motors Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
109. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7.6 (Smith-Hurd 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. §§
367.260, .290 (Supp. 1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:10IV (Supp. 1979); N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-10 (Michie 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.110 (West 1978).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1314 (1976). See note 40 supra.
111. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51-150 (West 1965); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-404
(1980).
112. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-404 (1980) (emphasis added).
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view may be had by a demandee at an enforcement proceeding,11 3
statutes with provisions similar to the Tennessee law by no means
assure that the court will allow a demandee to challenge the CID's
validity. Thus, under the reasoning of Oklahoma Press and Mor-
ton Salt, such statutes would appear to be unconstitutional to the
extent that demandees are denied this right.
This preliminary conclusion, however, is not the only constitu-
tional objection arising from the timing of judicial review. CID
statutes that permit an administrative official to obtain documen-
tary material by voluntary compliance prior to judicial review may
be subject to another constitutional challenge. As early as
Oklahoma Press, Justice Murphy, writing in dissent, noted the
often involuntary nature of "voluntary" compliance. Many individ-
uals and businesses, faced with an official demand for documentary
evidence, comply with the demand ignorant of the right to chal-
lenge its reasonableness. Responding to this inequity, Justice Mur-
phy made the following observation:
To allow a non-judicial officer, unarmed with judicial process, to demand the
books and papers of an individual is an open invitation to abuse of that
power. It is no answer that the individual may refuse to produce the material
demanded. Many persons have yielded solely because of the air of authority
with which the demand is made, a demand that cannot be enforced without
subsequent judicial aid. Many invasions of private rights thus occur without
the restraining hand of the judiciary ever intervening. 114
As these observations indicate, it may be a surprise, and certainly
small consolation, for the recipient of a CID to learn after a com-
prehensive and harrassing investigation that the administrative
agent acted beyond his constitutional authority. It is particularly
irksome to the demandee to discover that, in an attempt to comply
with apparent authority, he has waived'1 5 his constitutionally pro-
tected right to have the reasonableness of the demand determined
by a neutral and detached magistrate. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that the right to challenge a CID is as well known among the gen-
eral lay population as is, for example, the right to refuse consent to
an automobile search."16
To meet Justice Murphy's objection, all CIDs should either
113. See B. MsziNss, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, supra note 5, § 21.02, at 21-9.
114. 327 U.S. at 219.
115. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-46 (1973). In Schneckloth, the
Court held that consent given to an official search constituted a waiver of fourth amend-
ment protections even though such consent was not "an intentional relinquishment... of a
known right or privilege." Id. at 246. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
116. 412 U.S. at 235-46.
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undergo judicial examination prior to issuance or include a notice
to the demandee advising him of the right to seek judicial review
of the demand prior to its enforcement. Obviously, judicial review
prior to issuance provides the greater protection to the demandee.
Additionally, the argument that review prior to issuance burdens
both the court and the investigating agency and provides little ad-
ditional protection for the demandee is not valid. Under the con-
stitutional standards of Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt, an in-
vestigative demand must meet certain requirements. Implicit in
these requirements is the assumption that the investigating agency
will readily show a court that those requirements are met. If the
agency cannot show that the demand is reasonable, then it is cer-
tainly worth judicial time to halt the agency from proceeding with
an unreasonable demand-especially in light of possible voluntary
compliance by the demandee absent this prior review. Conse-
quently, the advantages to the demandee of the inclusion of timing
and notice requirements in connection with constitutionally man-
dated judicial review more than offset the slight inconveniences
imposed upon the courts and the investigating agency.
2. The Standard of Review
Although the administrative search cases such as Camara and
See do not apply directly to CIDs,117 the analysis used in those
cases does shed light on the relationship between the degree of
governmental intrusion and consequential protections provided to
the demandee by the fourth amendment. Obviously, an on-site in-
spection of an individual's home or business premises is more in-
trusive than a demand for production of his books and papers. The
Court recognized this fact in Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt by
terming administrative demands for information "constructive"
searches, and by providing the demandee less fourth amendment
protection than in the case of an actual search. Similarly, the
Court in Camara and See, while relying upon administrative sub-
poena cases in determining that a demandee is entitled to judicial
review prior to enforcement, clearly went beyond the protections
afforded in subpoena cases by requiring that an administrative de-
mand to inspect be enforceable only with a warrant issued by a
judge on a showing of probable cause. This higher thresh-
old-probable cause-clearly reflects the Court's response to a
greater governmental intrusion on the reasonable expectation of
117. See notes 68-91 supra and accompanying text.
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privacy of an individual or a business.
The use of CIDs has greatly increased in the last twenty
years.118 While many CID statutes119 provide limitations as to the
subject matter and scope of inquiries and require the investigator
to notify the demandee of the nature of the investigation, others
do not.120 Again, the Tennessee statute provides a good example. It
authorizes the state's attorney general, upon reasonable belief that
the state will be a party litigant, "to require any person to testify
under oath as to any matter which is a proper subject of in-
quiry." No additional provision is made to define the nature or
scope of an inquiry, and no provision is made to notify the de-
mandee of the subject under investigation. Clearly, the degree of
governmental intrusion inherent in this type of CID statute is
greater than the intrusion seen in either Morton Salt or Oklahoma
Press. In fact, investigation without any limitation as to its nature
or scope approaches the degree of intrusion in Camara and See
and argues for the imposition of their consequential requirement of
probable cause. While probable cause of some type currently must
precede the issuance of a CID under several state statutes,1 22
courts should fashion a probable cause standard as a fourth
amendment requirement for the enforcement of all CIDs.
An extension of the probable cause standard to CIDs, how-
ever, should not eliminate the Court's distinction either between
business and individual demandees or between closely regulated
and relatively unregulated businesses. The Court in Morton Salt
made a valid point in stating that businesses should not be able to
claim equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to pri-
vacy. 1 2  Businesses are artificial, profit-based entities that inti-
mately affect the daily life of society. Deriving benefits from soci-
ety in general and government in particular, these artificial entities
should expect an enhanced degree of regulation. 24 In addition,
those individuals who voluntarily have chosen to conduct a busi-
ness in an area traditionally permeated by government regulation
ought to be subject to greater regulation and investigation for the
118. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
119. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 367.110-.300 (Supp. 1976).
120. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93A, § 6 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975); MICH. CoMP. LAws
§ 445.907 (Supp. 1980).
121. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-402 (1980) (emphasis added).
122. E.g., MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 82-15-204 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-3 (West
1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-401 (1980).




protection of the public as a whole.125
Thus, the standard of probable cause must vary with the cate-
gory into which the demandee falls. For this reason, similar to Col-
onnade and Biswell, the requirement of probable cause need not
be extended to a CID issued to a closely regulated business. A de-
mand issued to an individual who is the target of an investigation,
however, should be enforced only upon a showing of probable
cause that a violation has been or is about to be committed. A de-
mand issued to a non-closely regulated business that is the target
of an investigation should issue only when there is probable cause
to believe that reasonable administrative standards for conducting
an investigation have been met. This dual standard reflects the dif-
fering expectations of privacy between businesses and individu-
als.126 Finally, a demand issued to an individual who is not the tar-
get of an investigation 12 7 should be enforced only if there is
probable cause that the demandee is in possession, custody, or con-
trol of documents pertinent to the investigation.
This three-level CID standard is not a new creation. It bor-
rows heavily from current fourth amendment requirements con-
cerning on-site administrative inspections and applies them to ad-
ministrative subpoenas for documentary material or oral
testimony. Its only true addition is its limitation on civil investiga-
tive demands issued to individuals not targeted by the investiga-
tion. It is submitted that this three-level standard, which strictly
observes the fourth amendment protections afforded the individual
while allowing for necessary business regulation, will most effec-
tively and appropriately apply the fourth amendment's search and
seizure provisions to CID.
4. State Constitutional Protections
Following a series of cases handed down by the Burger court
enunciating a more restrictive view of fourth amendment protec-
tions in general, 1 8 several state courts accepted search and seizure
challenges based upon comparable state constitutional provi-
125. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
126. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
127. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976); Ky. REv. STAT. § 367.240 (Supp. 1980); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 356:10 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-10 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-
401 (1980); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.86.110 (1978).
128. E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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sions.2 9 While the importance of these parallel state challenges
should not be exaggerated, neither should they be overlooked.
State courts that may be reluctant to expand federal constitutional
law, regardless of how appropriate such an expansion might be,
may well accept search and seizure objections based upon the pro-
visions of state constitutions.
In In re Investigation No. 2130 the New Mexico Supreme
Court upheld the validity of an administrative subpoena issued
pursuant to the state's Organized Crime Act."' Although the ma-
jority did not reach the merits of petitioner's fourth amendment
claim, it did cite Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt for the proposi-
tion that the subpoena must be sufficiently limited in scope and
relevant in purpose.13 2 While agreeing with the majority's disposi-
tion of the fourth amendment issue, Chief Justice McManus in a
separate opinion stated that he would afford New Mexico citizens
greater protection of privacy under the provisions of the state con-
stitution. 133 The Chief Justice noted that, as ultimate arbiter of
New Mexico law, the state's supreme court was free to read provi-
sions of the state constitution more expansively than the corre-
sponding federal language. The Chief Justice went on to declare
that
[a]lthough administrative subpoenas are not equivalent to the search and
seizure provisions associated with a warrant, a subpoena in aid of an investi-
gation is clearly a search of citizen's papers and effects. This type of a sub-
poena which calls for the production of private records functions in the same
manner as a warrant insofar as it violates one's constitutional right to be se-
cure in their papers and effects . . . [therefore] I would adopt a different
approach from the federal due process standard and grant the citizens of this
state greater protection "in their persons, papers, homes and effects". ... 1
129. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550-51, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 329 (1975); People v. Clyne, 189 Colo. 412, 541 P.2d 71 (1975); State v. Johnson,
68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975); Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 239 A.2d 290 (1968);
State v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544 (Tenn. 1979); State v. Hehman, 14 Wash. App. 770, 544 P.2d
1257 (1976).
130. 91 N.M. 516, 577 P.2d 414 (1978).
131. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-9-1 to -17 (1978).
132. 91 N.M. at 517-18, 577 P.2d at 415-16.
133. Id. See State v. Hodges, 89 N.M. 351, 356, 552 P.2d 787, 792 (1976). Section 10,
Article II of the New Mexico Constitution provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person
or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the persons or
things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation.
134. 91 N.M. at 519-20, 577 P.2d at 417-18.
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State court judges, who may be hesitant to alter federal constitu-
tional law, indeed may become more receptive to such state law
challenges. Certainly counsel for the demandee should be aware of
and explore this avenue of relief for his client.
5. Alternative Methods and Standards
The primary alternative methods used to gather information
sought by a CID have been the grand jury investigation and the
use of discovery proceedings following the filing of a skeletal com-
plaint. 35 As indicated above, the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.386 has been interpreted as
holding that use of the grand jury with no intent to bring a crimi-
nal action constitutes an abuse of process.13 7 Nevertheless, this
Note contends that at least where the demandee is also an individ-
ual who is the target of an investigation, a CID should issue only
upon a showing of probable cause that a violation has been or is
about to be committed.138 Therefore, with respect to such an indi-
vidual, the use of a grand jury as a means of obtaining information
should not constitute an abuse of process. In fact, use of the grand
jury subpoena instead of a CID would increase the privacy protec-
tion of the demandee by allowing a group of his peers to operate as
a buffer between the demandee and the investigating agency. Con-
sidering the Supreme Court's pronouncement in the area of grand
jury investigations, however, a CID is still the more appropriate
technique when the demandee either is not the target of the inves-
tigation or is a targeted business.
Obtaining information by use of liberal discovery rules subse-
quent to the filing of a skeletal complaint has been disfavored sup-
posedly because it was considered unfair for the state to file suit
solely to obtain information. 3 9 Nevertheless, this view must be
weighed against the advantages associated with the use of discov-
ery proceedings instead of CIDs. First, no production of any docu-
ment or other material could be compelled without prior judicial
approval.140 Second, the inquiry target could obtain a judicial pro-
tective order covering certain of the requested material."' Last,
135. See generally notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
136. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
137. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
138. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
139. See note 48 supra.
140. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 34(b), 37.
141. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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the opportunity for reciprocal discovery would provide the inquiry
target with additional information concerning the nature of the in-
vestigation. 14 2 In effect, these advantages may provide safeguards
to the demandee beyond the safeguards that this Note suggests for
CIDs.
III. FIFTH AMENDMENT SELF-INCRIMINATION
As recently as Maness v. Meyers'4- the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed its earlier holdings144 that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies to any civil, criminal, administra-
tive, or judicial proceeding. The fifth amendment privilege applies
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 14  Once this foundation has been laid, however,
problems arise in the practical application of the privilege to CID
statutes. Does the protection afforded by the privilege vary accord-
ing to the particular demandee? Against whom may information
obtained be used in subsequent proceedings? How does the offer of
immunity alter the scope of the privilege? What type of immunity
need be offered? This Note briefly outlines the current status of
the law on these issues and then offers suggestions on improve-
ments that should, and in some instances must, be made to remedy
constitutional infirmities.
A. Nature of the Demandee
1. Business Versus Nonbusiness
In Oklahoma Press the Court held that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to corporations
or their officers who must produce corporate records pursuant to a
lawful judicial order. 146 Furthermore, corporate officers cannot
claim the privilege when information is obtained from the corpora-
tion. 47 There is authority, however, for the proposition that the
fifth amendment may limit the indefiniteness or the breadth of the
142. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
143. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
144. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (White, J., concurring); McCar-
thy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
145. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470 (1976); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
146. 327 U.S. 186, 196 (1946); see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906).
147. 327 U.S. at 205.
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inquiry.148 Concurring in Fisher v. United States,149 Justice Bren-
nan, citing Wilson v. United States, 50 stated that, although the
fifth amendment did extend to the compelled production of per-
sonal records, generally business entities were not "persons" within
the meaning of the amendment and hence could not assert the
privilege. Nevertheless, he noted that the Court had extended the
privilege to a sole proprietor or practitioner on the theory that the
operator and the business were not distinct entities.' 5 '
The distinction between corporate officers and sole proprietors
ignores the common perception of fifth amendment protections.
While a business or a corporation obviously does not fall within
the scope of the fifth amendment, a corporate officer or business
partner should be afforded protection during investigations con-
cerning his participation in the enterprise. It is incongruous that a
corporate official could be compelled to incriminate himself, while
the owner of a sole proprietorship can refuse to cooperate. Evi-
dence offered by such a corporate officer, like all compelled self-
incriminating testimony, is of questionable veracity. It is precisely
this situation in which the corporate or business official is faced
with "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or con-
tempt.' ' 5 2 Therefore, it is suggested that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-:incrimination should be extended to corpo-
rate or business officials who receive an investigative demand con-
cerning their business. This extension would not protect the de-
mandee from the production of the evidence through other sources
or demandees. It would, however, protect the CID recipient from
compelled self-incrimination.
2. Third Party Demandees
As noted above, a party is privileged from producing self-in-
criminating evidence, but not from its production by another
source.5 3 This general proposition, however, is not without limita-
tion. In Fisher v. United States'54 individual defendants, under in-
148. Ajello v. Hartford Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 32 Conn. Supp. 198, 347 A.2d 113
(1975).
149. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
150. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
151. 425 U.S. at 426-27 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85, 87-88 (1974).
152. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476 (1976); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
153. 427 U.S. at 473; Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
154. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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vestigation for civil and criminal tax liability, had their account-
ants prepare certain documents which defendants subsequently
transferred to their attorneys. 155 IRS agents served summonses on
the attorneys to require production of the documents, and when
the attorneys refused to comply the IRS brought suit to compel
production.15 The Supreme Court upheld the IRS' position, stat-
ing that the fifth amendment privilege was a personal right of the
demandee 57 and that defendants, therefore, had no standing to
raise the issue of compelled self-incrimination. The Court acknowl-
edged that defendants could not be forced to give incriminating
testimony or to produce private papers in their possession. 158 Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that defendants' attorneys could not be
compelled to produce material within the scope of the attorney-
client privilege. 59 The Court, however, refused to extend the scope
of the fifth amendment privilege beyond compelled self-incrimina-
tion by the demandee. The Court dismissed defendants' conten-
tion that the production of papers by one's attorneys testifies to
their existence and possession, declaring that such an admission
fell outside the protection of the fifth amendment. 60
Although the Court subsequently held in Andresen v. Mary-
land'6 ' that the mere production of material itself-with the con-
sequent admission of its existence and possession-could consti-
tute prohibited compelled self-incrimination, the Fisher holding
remains essentially unchanged: absent a privileged relationship be-
tween the accused and the demandee, and a legitimate justification
for possession by the demandee of the accused's private papers,
the true target of the inquiry may not assert the fifth amendment
privilege on behalf of the third party demandee. Despite this
rather restrictive reading of the privilege, such a position is consis-
tent with the purpose of the amendment. 6 2 Unlike the corporate
or business officer, the third party demandee has no overriding in-
centive to be untruthful in his testimony or production. The third
party demandee does not face the same "cruel trilemma" as the
155. Id. at 393-94.
156. Id. at 395.
157. Id. at 397-98.
158. Id. at 398.
159. Id. at 403.
160. Id. at 410-11.
161. 427 U.S. 463, 473-74 (1976).
162. Historically, the purpose of the fifth amendment's prohibition against compelled
self-incrimination has been to assure or promote truthful testimony. See generally Y.
KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 510-12 (4th ed. 1974).
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corporate or business demandee. The third party demandee, how-
ever, may assert the fifth amendment privilege on his own behalf
should he be called upon to incriminate himself. Therefore, con-
cerning the furnishing of information by third party demandees,
CID practice is in accord with appropriate fifth amendment doc-
trine and needs no modification or revision.
B. Grant of Immunity
In Hale v. Henkel6 3 the Court declared that "[t]he interdic-
tion of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness is
asked to incriminate himself-in other words, to give testimony
which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if the
criminality has already been taken away, the Amendment ceases to
apply."'" Henkel demonstrates that if the state confers immunity
from prosecution on a witness then that witness can be compelled
to give self-incriminating testimony. Although Henkel was initially
interpreted as requiring transactional immunity 6" in return for the
compelled testimony, the Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United
States 6 held that use and derivative use immunity is coextensive
with the scope of the fifth amendment privilege.16 7 The Court
rightly recognized that the purpose of the fifth amendment is to
protect an individual against compelled self-incriminating testi-
mony. The privilege does not mean that one who invokes it cannot
be prosecuted subsequently for a crime related to his testimony."s
Most CID statutes do not explicitly provide for use and derivative
use immunity, and this omission does not render such statutes con-
stitutionally infirm.6 " Nevertheless, it is suggested that specific in-
clusion of immunity provisions would be beneficial. Apart from the
tempering effect its inclusion might have on enthusiastic investi-
gating officials, explicit mention of such immunity in the statute
163. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
164. Id. at 67.
165. "Transactional immunity" extends not only to "prosecutions resulting from the
use of evidence given under oath or subpoena, and to evidence derived from such testimony,
but also to evidence uncovered from testimony given under oath which was substantially
connected with the transaction covered by the indictment." People v. Crawford Distrib. Co.,
53 Ill. 2d 332, 340, 291 N.E.2d 648, 653 (1972).
166. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
167. "Use and derivative use immunity" protects a witness from prosecution resulting
"from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom. . . ... Id. at 452-53.
168. Id. at 453.
169. See generally Memorandum of the Chancellor, State ex rel. Shriver v. Leech, No.
79-761-I, slip op. at 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 1979).
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might very well prohibit unknowing or unintentional waiver of the
privilege. It is unlikely that compelled oral testimony under a CID
constitutes custodial interrogation 7 0 of a degree necessary to man-
date Miranda warnings prior to questioning. 1 7 A plain statement
in the CID statute of the required grant of immunity, however,
would help eliminate involuntary waivers of the privilege by de-
mandees and assure investigating officials that the CID examina-
tion is not subject to the Miranda standards. 2
IV. NONRECIPROCAL DISCOVERY
In Wardius v. Oregon"'7 the Supreme Court examined an Ore-
gon "notice of alibi" statute"14 challenged by petitioner who had
been convicted for the unlawful sale of narcotics. 175 Unlike a simi-
lar Florida statute earlier upheld by the Court,"' 6 the Oregon alibi
statute did not provide the defendant with a corresponding oppor-
tunity to discover the evidence possessed by the state. 177 In a brief
opinion the Court declared that, although the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment did not require Oregon to afford its
criminal defendants access to the rules of discovery,7'8 due process
did prohibit Oregon from granting discovery to the government
while denying it to the defendant."'9 The Court stated that "in the
absence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, dis-
covery must be a two-way street. The State may not insist that
trials be run as a 'search for truth' so far as defense witnesses are
concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own wit-
nesses."' 80 The Court labelled the Oregon unilateral rules of crimi-
nal discovery "fundamentally unfair."''
170. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
171. Id. See United States v. Globe Chem. Co., 311 F. Supp. 535 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
172. 384 U.S. at 467-73.
173. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
174. OR. REv. STAT. § 135.455 (1979) (previously codified at OR. REv. STAT. § 135.875).
Generally, a notice of alibi statute requires that a defendant in a criminal trial provide the
prosecution with a list of the names and addresses of witnesses that he intends to call to
verify his alibi defense. The defendant must also reveal the nature of his alibi. Failure to
provide such information within a specified pre-trial period results in the inability to intro-
duce evidence of the alibi defense.
175. 412 U.S. at 472.
176. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
177. 412 U.S. at 475.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (footnote omitted).
181. Id. at 476.
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Plaintiffs raised the application of this "reciprocity" standard
to the Tennessee CID statute182 in State ex rel. Shriver.183 Noting
that the Tennessee CID statute failed to afford the demandee any
opportunity to discover details concerning the nature of the in-
quiry, plaintiffs stressed the Supreme Court's requirement that
discovery be a "two-way street."' 84 The State, however, argued
that Wardius dealt solely with a pretrial criminal proceeding and
should not be extended to precomplaint investigations.18 5 Further-
more, the State asserted that the demandee would be afforded dis-
covery subsequent to the filing of a complaint if the investigation
were to proceed to that point.186 The chancellor found Wardius
distinguishable from an investigative demand, 87 but limited the
use of evidence acquired to impeachment only.188 On appeal Judge
Todd reversed the ruling of the chancellor, stating simply that
"[d]ue process requires reciprocal discovery."18 9 Judge Todd as-
serted that nonreciprocal discovery could only be justified by a
strong showing of a special public interest, such as an activity af-
fecting the public health, safety, or morals.1 90 "Special" public in-
terest could not mean any aspect of private life, and since the Ten-
nessee CID statute authorized investigation by the state of any
matter, the court held the statute to be unconstitutional.1 91
It is clear that the "reciprocity" requirement of Wardius has
not been extended beyond the immediate pretrial stage, much less
to a precomplaint investigation. Moreover, both Wardius and its
predecessor, Williams v. Florida,192 dealt exclusively with felony
prosecutions. The Court in these cases recognized the particular
182. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-6-401 to -407 (1980).
183. State ex rel. Shriver v. Leech, No. 79-761 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 28, 1980); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8-6-402 (1980).
184. Plaintiffs' Brief at 23, State ex rel. Shriver v. Leech, No. 79-761 (Tenn. Ct. App.
March 28, 1980). See also United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Higginbotham, 539 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Hairston v. War-
den, 407 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
185. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider at 2, State ex rel. Shriver v.
Leech, No. 79-761 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 28, 1980).
186. Id.
187. Memorandum of the Chancellor, State ex rel. Shriver v. Leech, No. 79-761-11, slip
op. at 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 1979).
188. Id. at 11; Supplemental Memorandum of the Chancellor at 4, July 12, 1979, State
ex rel. Shriver v. Leech, No. 79-761 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 28, 1980).
189. State ex. rel. Shriver v. Leech, No. 79-761, slip op. at 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 28,
1980).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 8-9.
192. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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importance of guaranteeing equal access to information when the
defendant faced serious criminal penalties. Therefore, reciprocal
discovery is not constitutionally required. Despite the lack of con-
stitutional objections, however, the demandee does have an impor-
tant interest in some type of discovery prior to the filing of a for-
mal complaint. If the suit is preceded by a lengthy investigation,
evidence discoverable by the demandee may become stale. Some
witnesses may have become unavailable, and the memory of availa-
ble witnesses may have dimmed. In addition, immediate discovery
would apprise the demandee of the exact nature of the inquiry and
perhaps eliminate the production of irrelevant documentary mate-
rial. Finally, immediate discovery would reveal the purpose of the
inquiry and prevent investigations designed to harass the de-
mandee. Thus, CID statutes should afford some form of precom-
plaint discovery. This discovery may be limited to an explanation
of the nature of the investigation, a listing of witnesses interviewed
by the government, and the testimony and/or documentary mate-
rial obtained. It is suggested that this form of discovery will pro-
tect the demandee from groundless inquiry and promote a more
efficient civil investigation. 193
V. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In Fuentes v. Shevin 1' Justice Stewart described the century-
old notion of procedural due process: "'Parties whose rights are to
be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified.' . . . It is equally fun-
damental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
'must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner.' '195 This due process concept provides the basis for a proce-
dural due process challenge to many state CID statutes. Although
the government is not required to provide a hearing for every im-
pairment of a private interest, 98 the greater the private interest
involved, and the less compelling the state interest in the impair-
193. See Proposed Model Statute in Part VIII infra. Disclosure of other information
obtained by the investigative agency would be subject to the confidentiality requirements
set forth in Part VI infra.
194. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
195. Id. at 80 (citations omitted). See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Gran-
nis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Windsor v. Mc-
Veigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863).
196. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Lewandowski v. Danforth,
547 S.W.2d 470 (Mo.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977).
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ment, the more extensive the procedures authorizing such impair-
ment must be. 197 Procedural due process objections to a CID stat-
ute may involve either a claim that the CID did not adequately
notify the demandee of the nature of the investigation or of the
particular materials requested, or that the state did not afford the
demandee an opportunity to be heard prior to enforcement of the
demand.
In Lewandowski v. Danforthee the Missouri Supreme Court
addressed these two issues in the context of the Missouri CID stat-
ute. Appellants, the principals of Pen Pals International (PPI), in-
situted a proceeding to set aside the CID issued by the attorney
general calling for the production of a number of documents.'91
The court reiterated Justice Stewart's statement in Fuentes,2 0 0 but
found that the Missouri statute satisfied the requirements of pro-
cedural due process.2° ' The court asserted that the statute, °2
which required the attorney general to state the nature of the in-
vestigation and to specify the documents sought by the CID, pro-
vided the demandee with adequate notice of the scope of the in-
quiry.20 The statute also granted the demandee an opportunity to
197. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
198. 547 S.W.2d 470 (Mo.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977).
199. Id. at 471. The CID requested the following information:
1. the actual number of solicitations mailed by PPI to Missourians since January
1, 1975;
2. the number of State residents who enrolled with PPI under the "half price
discount offer";
3. the names of members across the nation who are known by PPI to have
formed "strong and romantic attachments" and "marriages" that resulted from as-
sociations formed through PPI;
4. a gross income and cost statement, including the salaries, wages and profits of
all employees and owners;
5. a list of names, addresses and phone numbers of all Missourians who have
joined PPI since January 1, 1975;
6. a list of the names and addresses of all employees, past or present, of PPI since
January 1, 1975.
Id.
200. Id. at 472; see text accompanying note 195 supra.
201. 547 S.W.2d at 472-73.
202. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.040.2 (Vernon 1979) provides in part:
2. Each civil investigative demand shall:
(1) State the statute and section thereof, the alleged violation of which is under
investigation, and the general subject matter of the investigation;
(2) Describe the class or classes of information, documentary material, or physi-
cal evidence to be produced thereunder with reasonable specificity so as fairly to indi-
cate the material demanded. . ..
203. 547 S.W.2d at 473.
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petition the court to modify or set aside the demand prior to its
enforcement. 204 Therefore, the court also determined that it af-
forded the demandee an adequate opportunity to be heard.
Although the court in Lewandowski upheld the Missouri CID
statute in question, the implication of the decision is that a statute
that did not provide similar constitutional safeguards would not
afford the demandee adequate procedural due process. Many state
CID statutes,205 and the federal Antitrust Civil Process Act,208 ex-
plicitly require the CID to state the nature of the inquiry and to
describe the material requested with particularity, while also al-
lowing the demandee to petition the appropriate court for judicial
review of the demand prior to its enforcement. Other state CID
statutes, however, lack such procedures and requirements,20 7 and
thus should be held constitutionally infirm. Absent a statutory
provision affording the demandee reciprocal discovery of the na-
ture of the inquiry, 08 procedural due process mandates that all
CID statutes require the following: first, that the administrative
official inform the demandee of the particulars of the investigation;
second, that the demand state with specificity the documentary
materials sought; and third, that the demandee have access to a
204. Id. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.070 (Vernon 1979) provides:
At any time before the return date specified in the demand, or within twenty days after
the demand has been served, whichever period is shorter, a petition to extend the re-
turn date for, or to modify or set aside the demand, stating good cause, may be filed in
the circuit court of the county where the parties reside or in the circuit court of Cole
county.
205. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 356:10 (Supp. 1979).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976) provides in part:
(b) Contents
Each such demand shall-
(1) state the nature of-
(A) the conduct constituting the alleged antitrust violation, or
(B) the activities in preparation for a merger, acquisition, joint venture,
or similar transaction, which, if consummated, may result in an antitrust
violation,
which are under investigation and the provision of law applicable thereto;
(2) if it is a demand for the production of documentary material-
(A) describe the class or classes of documentary material produced there-
under with such definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to be
fairly identified. ...
In addition to the above notice, the Act also provides the demandee an opportunity to mod-
ify or set aside the demand similar to the Missouri statute upheld in Lewandowski. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1312(b), 1314(b).
207. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-9 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-6-401 to -407
(1980).
208. See Part IV supra.
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judicial forum in order to object to the scope of the demand prior
to its enforcement.0 9
VI. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The fifth amendment provides that "No person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."210 A CID that requires the demandee to produce
documentary material or to make such material available for in-
spection could be subject to a substantive due process challenge on
two separate grounds. First, depriving the owner of possession of
the material may constitute a "taking" within the meaning of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. Second, an administrative
agency's disclosure of trade secrets obtained from the demandee
may amount to a deprivation of property without due process of
law. The first objection may be satisfied by requiring only that the
demandee make such documents available for inspection and by
placing the cost of duplicating the material upon the investigating
agency. Resolution of the problem of the disclosure of trade
secrets, however, is more troublesome.
Although the court in State ex rel. Shriver 11 did not explicitly
rule on any substantive due process challenge to the Tennessee
CID statute, plaintiffs raised this argument by alleging that they
had substantial property rights in their trade secrets and other
confidential documents that should be protected from disclosure
under the investigative demand. 12 Plaintiffs noted that the Anti-
trust Civil Process Act prohibits the compelled production of any
material that would be privileged under the standards applicable
to a judicial subpoena duces tecum or under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 13 Similarly, several state CID statutes specifically
209. This constitutional argument based upon prior opportunity to be heard is distinct
from the prior judicial review discussed in Part II supra concerning fourth amendment safe-
guards. Regardless of the applicability of the fourth amendment to CID statutes, procedural
due process should require that the demandee be afforded an opportunity to challenge the
demand prior to the compelled production of private papers.
210. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment also provides that no State
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
211. No. 79-761 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 28, 1980).
212. Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Amended Motion to Dismiss at 26, State ex rel.
Shriver v. Leech, No. 79-761 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 28, 1980).
213. 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976). Section 1312(c) provides:
No such demand shall require the production of any documentary material, the
submission of any answers to written interrogatories, or the giving of any oral testi-
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exempt trade secrets from the scope of a CID.214 Plaintiffs charged
that the Tennessee CID statute, which prohibits disclosure of evi-
dence obtained except by the attorney general "in the discharge of
the duties of the office or in legal proceedings in which the state is
a party, ' 215 provided little or no protection for plaintiffs' confiden-
tial information.218
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in In re Southern Bell
Telephone and Telegraph Co.,2117 affirmed a lower court's issuance
of a protective order covering certain documentary material sub-
poenaed from petitioner by the state attorney general.21 8 Implying
judicial authority to issue such an order, the court declared that
"the potential for harm and embarrassment. . . is highest at those
early stages of investigation, when the evidence may be insubstan-
tial and incompetent, yet very damaging and when disclosure is
not subject to the safeguards imposed in judicial proceedings. '21 9 A
federal district court similarly implied judicial authority to issue a
protective order covering a CID in Aluminum Co. of America v.
United States Department of Justice.22 0 The court held that de-
spite Antitrust Civil Process Act amendments that expanded the
mony, if such material, answers, or testimony would be protected from disclosure
under-
(1) the standards applicable to subpenas [sic] or subpenas [sic] duces tecum
issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation, or
(2) the standards applicable to discovery requests under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, to the extent that the application of such standards to any demand
is appropriate and consistent with the provisions and purpose of this chapter.
The ACP Act was amended in 1976 to allow obtained material to be used by any authorized
official of the Justice Department "in connection with the taking of oral testimony. . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1976). In Aluminum Co. of America v. United States Dept. of Justice,
444 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 (D.D.C. 1978), the district court stated that this expanded use of
documentary material was offset by the imposition of the stricter standards applicable to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
214. For example, the Massachusetts CID statute provides in part:
(5) No such notice shall contain any requirement which would be unreasonable or
improper if contained in a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court or the common-
wealth; or require the disclosure of any documentary material which would be privi-
leged, or which contains trade secret information, or which for any other reason would
not be required by a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the commonwealth.
MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 6(5) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975). See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.86.110(6) (1978).
215. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-407 (1980).
216. Plaintiffs' Brief at 27, State ex reL. Shriver v. Leech, No. 79-761 (Tenn. Ct. App.
March 28, 1980).
217. 30 N.C. App. 585, 227 S.E.2d 645 (1976).
218. Id. at 589, 227 S.E.2d at 648.
219. Id. at 588, 227 S.E.2d at 647.
220. 444 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1978).
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use of information obtained under a CID,221 a demandee was still
entitled to protection against "unwarranted and unreasonable gov-
ernment intrusion. '2 2 The court ordered the government to in-
form the petitioner of its proposed disclosure of information to cer-
tain persons at least twenty-five days prior to such disclosure, and
further declared that the petitioner could contest the disclosure in
a judicial proceeding.2
It is well established that fifth and fourteenth amendment
protections extend to corporations and businesses as well as to in-
dividuals.2 4 Although a corporation does not possess all the rights
of an individual,225 the state may not take the property of a corpo-
ration without compensation, nor may it proceed against a corpo-
ration without due process of law.226 Therefore, it is submitted that
civil investigative demand statutes authorizing the compelled pro-
duction of documentary material and/or oral testimony from either
business or nonbusiness demandees, without providing for judicial
protection of confidential information and trade secrets, unconsti-
tutionally deprive the CID recipient of property without due pro-
cess of law.
VII. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Several CID recipients have claimed that an administrative of-
ficer's power to subpoena witnesses and compel the production of
documents constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative or judi-
cial investigative authority. Although case law in this area is
sparse, it is clear that challenges to the CID based upon this argu-
ment have been singularly unsuccessful.2 27
In People v. Crawford Distributing Co. 22 8 the Supreme Court
of Illinois addressed the appellee's contention that delegation of
the subpoena power violated the separation of powers doctrine.
221. See note 213 supra.
222. 444 F. Supp. at 1346 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2596, 2602).
223. Id. at 1347-48.
224. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Hale v. Hinkel, 201
U.S. 43, 76 (1906); Blawis v. Bolin, 358 F. Supp. 349, 354 (D. Ariz. 1973).
225. See 358 F. Supp. at 354.
226. 201 U.S. at 76.
227. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Killian, 30 Conn. Supp. 87, 301 A.2d 562 (Super. Ct. 1973);
In re McGowen, 303 A.2d 645 (Del. 1973) (subpoena nevertheless quashed because too open-
ended and issued pursuant to a police rather than a grand jury investigation); In re Blue
Hen Country Network, Inc., 314 A.2d 197 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); People v. Crawford Distrib.
Co., 53 Ill. 2d 332, 291 N.E.2d 648 (1973).
228. 53 Ill. 2d 332, 291 N.E.2d 648 (1973).
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The court examined the state constitutional provision outlining the
authority of the attorney general and stated:
Although the subpoena power is not vested in the Attorney General
under the constitution of 1970, we hold that the constitutional provision that
"[t]he Attorney General. . . shall have the duties and powers. . . prescribed
by law," is sufficiently broad to warrant such a legislative grant. Also, this
court has held that the powers and duties of the Attorney General include
not only those powers conferred upon him by statute, but also those powers
and duties inherent in the office as it existed at common law.22'
Under the court's reasoning in Crawford, CID recipients in those
states without broad constitutional or common-law grants of au-
thority to the attorney general 230 may have a strong argument that
delegation of the subpoena power constitutes a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine.
Two Delaware court decisions have also upheld the authority
of the attorney general to issue CIDs in the face of separation of
powers objections. In In re McGowen23 1 the Delaware Supreme
Court stated that the purpose of the statutory grant was to confer
upon the attorney general authority similar to the grand jury in-
vestigative power, presumably to fill the long time gap between
sessions of the grand jury.2 3 2 In In re Blue Hen Country Network,
Inc.,2"' decided the same year, the Delaware Superior Court
granted a CID enforcement petition of the attorney general, re-
jecting a demandee's claim that the investigative authority vested
in the administrative official was overly broad.23' Following Mc-
Gowen, the superior court likened the power of the attorney gen-
eral to that of the grand jury, which had traditionally been af-
forded wide investigative authority.25 These Delaware decisions,
however, fail to recognize that an administrative inquiry, unlike a
grand jury investigation, does not provide the at least theoretically
neutral buffer of private citizens between the demandee and the
law enforcement authority.236 Despite this shortcoming, the hold-
ings in McGowen and Blue Hen are representative of the views
taken by most, if not all, state courts in reported decisions, when
faced with a CID separation of powers challenge. It appears, there-
229. Id. at 345-46, 291 N.E.2d at 656 (citing People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli, 415 IlM. 79,
112 N.E.2d 156 (1953)).
230. See Smith v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 559, 422 P.2d 123 (1967).
231. 303 A.2d 645 (Del. 1973).
232. Id. at 647 (quoting In re Hawkins, 123 A.2d 113, 115 (Del. 1956)).
233. 314 A.2d 197 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973).
234. Id. at 200.
235. Id. at 199-200.
236. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
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fore, that an objection based upon a delegation of powers argument
may prove successful only in those states that provide a narrow
constitutional grant of powers to the attorney general or its
equivalent, and in which additional common-law authority for the
power is weak.
VIII. PROPOSED MODEL CIVIL INVESTIGATIvE DEMAND STATUTE
The primary focus of this Note has been the examination of
the bases for a constitutional challenge to the civil investigative
demand. The fact that the CID is the subject of such objections,
however, does not diminish its utility as an investigative device if
the relevant CID statute meets these objections. State attorneys
general require the CID as a necessary tool for carrying out their
investigative functions, and Congress and the several state legisla-
tures have recognized this need by enacting statutes providing for
the demand. This Note will therefore propose a model CID statute
that meets the demandee's constitutional objections while retain-
ing the positive qualities of the demand. The proposal is partially a
consolidation of some of the most appropriate provisions of ex-
isting CID statutes, and partially an incorporation of novel de-
mand requirements. Although in many instances the proposed
statute mirrors language widely accepted by legislatures and
courts, other sections of the statute modify existing statutory law
so as to bring it into compliance with present minimum constitu-
tional requirements. Finally, some provisions in the proposed stat-
ute set standards beyond those minimally required by the United
States Constitution, either because several states now mandate
such standards through state constitutional law,3 7 or because equi-
table considerations demand that such increased protections be af-
forded to the CID recipient.
Proposed Model Civil Investigative Demand Statute
§ 1. Definitions
a. "Civil investigative demand" or "demand" as used herein means a
precomplaint [request for, or judicial order compellinge 83] one or more of the
237. See text accompanying notes 129-34 supra.
238. The proposed statute will offer two alternative CID procedures, each of which
will satisfy current constitutional requirements. Because most state CIDs now authorize the
attorney general or his equivalent to issue a demand prior to obtaining judicial review of its
scope and contents, the proposed statute will offer a modified version of this procedure in
addition to the alternative statute which mandates initial judicial examination prior to issu-
ance of the demand. This modified version will facilitate quicker reform of many existing
CID statutes, both by reducing the number of statutory changes that must be made, and by
presenting a statute with which most legislatures will already be partially familiar. The ver-
1486 [Vol. 33:1451
following: the production of documentary material for inspection and copying
or reproduction; the completion in writing of written interrogatories; or the
giving of oral testimony by the demand recipient.
b. "Business" as used herein means any commercial entity, including,
but not limited to, a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or
association.
c. "Closely regulated": whether an entity is to be deemed a "closely reg-
ulated" entity shall be determined with reference to the following
considerations:
(1) the nature of the goods or services sold, leased, or rented by
the entity;
(2) the history of prior state governmental regulation of the
entity;
(3) the extent of present state governmental regulation of the en-
tity; and
(4) the nature and character of state governmental regulation of
the entity.2 3'
d. "Closely regulated business" as used herein means any commercial
entity (including, but not limited to, a sole proprietorship, partnership, cor-
poration, or association), including the owners, officers, or agents of such en-
tity, determined to be "closely regulated" as defined in § 1.b. of this Act.
e. "Documentary materials" as used herein includes, but is not limited
to, the original or any copy of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper,
communication, tabulation, chart, notation, log, or other document.
f. "Natural person" as used herein shall mean only an individual, not a
sole proprietor.
g. "Person" as used herein means any natural person, sole proprietor-
ship, partnership, corporation, association, or any other legal entity, except as
otherwise indicated.
h. "Probable cause" as used herein means:
(1) if the demand recipient is any person, other than a closely
regulated business, who is not under investigation for a possible viola-
tion of section [. . ], probable cause to believe that the demand recip-
ient is in possession, custody, or control of any information or docu-
mentary material that is sought by the demand and which is reasonably
relevant to an investigation of another person, other than a closely reg-
ulated business;
(2) if the demand recipient is a natural person who is the target
of an investigation by the attorney general, probable cause to believe
that the demand recipient has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to
engage in activity prohibited by sections [ . ], of the statutes of this
state'M and that the demand recipient is in possession, custody, or con-
sion requiring initial judicial review, however, is the preferred alternative. See notes 114-16
supra and accompanying text.
239. Rather than listing particular entities as "closely regulated," the Proposed Model
Statute offers several criteria for each state to apply to determine whether an entity is
"closely regulated." The particular entities that will be included in this provision will vary
from state to state, and will probably be expanded by future judicial rulings.
240. Each state should here designate the specific statutory provisions the violation of
which may be the subject of an investigation by the attorney general, and hence, may in-
volve the use of a civil investigative demand. No further citations for these blank statutory
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trol of any information or documentary material sought by the demand;
(3) if the demand recipient is a nonclosely regulated business that
is the target of an investigation by the attorney general, probable cause
to believe that reasonable administrative standards for conducting an
investigation have been met.
§ 2. Authorization of Investigation
The attorney general [or his duly authorized agent, or other official des-
ignated by statute]2 1 is hereby empowered and it shall be his duty, to con-
duct, or cause to be conducted, an investigation into any act, method or prac-
tice which is or may be a violation of sections [... ] of the statutes of this
state.
242
§ 3. Civil Investigative Demands
a. If the attorney general has probable cause to believe
(1) that any person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to en-
gage in any activity prohibited by sections [... ] of the statutes of this
state, or
(2) that any person possesses information concerning such pro-
hibited activity, he may apply to the [circuit or chancery]243 court in
the county where the person resides, is domiciled, is incorporated, or
conducts business, for an order issuing a civil investigative demand to
such person.
b. The court shall issue the demand to any such person other than a
closely regulated business only upon a showing of probable cause by the at-
torney general.
[a.a.] [alternative] If the attorney general has reason to believe that any
person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in any activity prohib-
ited by sections [ . ] of the statutes of this state, or possesses information
concerning such prohibited activity, he may issue to such person a civil inves-
tigative demand.
[b.b.][alternative] The attorney general shall have the demand served
upon any such person other than a closely regulated business only if he rea-
sonably believes that probable cause for the issuance of the demand exists.
c. Every demand served upon any person shall:
(1) state the nature of the alleged conduct under investigation;
(2) state the statute and section number therof, the past or pro-
spective violation of which is under investigation;
(3) list the documentary material sought to be produced, describ-
ing the same with reasonable definiteness and certainty;
(4) state with reasonable definiteness and certainty the written
interrogatories sought to be answered;
(5) describe with reasonable certainty any person from whom oral
testimony is sought who cannot otherwise be positively identified;
sections will be provided.
241. Each state should here designate the official to whom the investigatory power is
delegated. For the sake of brevity, this official shall hereinafter be referred to simply as the
attorney general.
242. This grant of power will be necessary in those states in which the constitutional
delineation of authority is vague or ambiguous. See Part VII supra.
243. The particular state legislature should here insert the appropriate judicial desig-
nation for the court that initially will deal with the demand.
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(6) prescribe dates, times, and places at which the documentary
material may be inspected and copied or reproduced, the answers to
written interrogatories are to be submitted, and/or the oral testimony
of the person is to be taken; provided, that no date earlier than [thirty
(30)]244 days following the service of the demand shall be specified;
(7) identify the official to whom such documentary material or
answers to written interrogatories are to be submitted, or by whom
such oral testimony is to be taken.
§ 4. Receipt of Information by Demand Recipient
At any time subsequent to the service of the demand, the demand recipi-
ent may, subject to § 8, serve upon the attorney general a request for addi-
tional information. The request may ask for further details concerning the
nature of the investigation, the names and addresses of other demand recipi-
ents connected with the conduct under investigation, and an opportunity to
inspect and copy documentary material and answers to written interrogato-
ries obtained from other such demand recipients.245
§ 5. Review and Enforcement
a. At any time prior to the earliest date specified in the demand, the
demand recipient may petition the [circuit or chancery]2"' court in the county
where he resides, is domiciled, is incorporated, or conducts business, 'for a
hearing to review the basis for the issuance of the demand, or for an order
modifying or setting aside the demand, or both. A hearing shall be granted if
requested by the demand recipient, absent good cause shown by the attorney
general why the petition for a hearing should be denied. The time allowed for
compliance with the demand shall not run during the pendency of the peti-
tion or the subsequent hearing except that the demand recipient shall comply
with any portion of the demand not sought to be modified or set aside in the
subsequent hearing.
b. Subsequent to the disposition of all such petitions filed by the de-
mand recipient, the court shall issue a final order stating the portion or por-
tions of the demand as originally issued, or as modified by the court, with
which the demand recipient must comply. If no timely petition for a hearing,
or for an order modifying or setting aside the demand, is filed, the original
demand shall constitute a final order of compliance.
[b.b.] [alternative]2 4 7 If a person fails to comply with an original or modi-
fied demand, the attorney general may petition the [circuit or chancery] 24 8
court in the county where the person resides, is domiciled, is incorporated, or
conducts business, for an order compelling compliance with such demand.
Upon a showing of probable cause, the court shall then issue a final order
stating the portion or portions of the demand as originally issued, or as modi-
fied by the court, with which the demand recipient must comply.
c. Any person who fails to comply with a final order of the court requir-
ing compliance with an original or modified demand, including any person
who appears but refuses to testify at the taking of oral testimony, shall be
guilty of a civil contempt, and shall be punished in accordance with the rele-
vant provisions of the laws of this state.
244. Each state may here insert its own respective time period.
245. See Part IV supra.
246. See note 243 supra.
247. See note 238 supra.
248. See note 243 supra.
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d. Any person who commits any of the following acts shall be [guilty of
a misdemeanor, or assessed a civil penalty of not more than [ . . . ], or
both]: 2 49
(1) intentionally avoids, evades, or impedes any investigation
under this Act, including the removal, concealment, alteration, or de-
struction of documentary material included in a demand pursuant to
the investigation;
(2) intentionally conceals relevant information;(3) . 250
e. At any time subsequent to the issuance of a request for additional
information and prior to a final order of compliance with the demand, the
demand recipient may petition the court for an order compelling compliance
with the request. The court shall then issue an order compelling compliance
with the request for additional information unless it finds that the disclosure
of certain information would be prohibited by § 8 of this Act, in which case
the court shall issue a final order stating which portions, if any, of the request
must be complied with. The time allowed for compliance with the demand
shall not run during the period beginning with the issuance of the request,
and ending with compliance with the request or a denial by the court of the
petition to compel compliance with the request, whichever period is shorter.
If the attorney general fails to comply with any final order issued by the
court hereunder, the court shall order that the demand served upon the per-
son requesting additional information be set aside.2 51
§ 6. Immunity of Demand Recipients
No oral testimony, written information, or documentary material ob-
tained from a person under a civil investigative demand, or any evidence de-
rived therefrom, shall be used subsequently against such person as substan-
tive evidence in any prosecution, unless such person has voluntarily waived
his privilege against self-incrimination.252 For purposes of this section, "per-
son" shall mean all natural persons, including owners, officers, and agents of
any business.
§ 7. Trade Secrets and Privileged Material
No demand shall require the production of any documentary material,
the submission of answers to written interrogatories, or the giving of any oral
testimony if such documentary material, answers, and/or oral testimony con-
stitutes a trade secret or other privileged information, or would be protected
from disclosure under the rules of civil procedure of this state. If a claim of
privileged information is raised, the court shall order an in camera inspection
249. Each state should here insert the desired criminal and/or civil penalty, and the
amount thereof.
250. Additional grounds for assessment of a penalty may be set forth by the individual
state.
251. It is the position of this Note that failure to afford limited reciprocal discovery to
the demand recipient should entirely preclude use of the demand itself.
252. See Part HI supra. "Waiver" in the context of the fifth amendment means "an
intentional relinquishment ... of a known right or privilege." See Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1973) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
For application of the waiver standard to compelled self-incrimination before an administra-
tive agency, see Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949). Of course, the states are free
to offer the demand recipient increased protection by affording transactional immunity
under state law. See Part I supra.
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of the information to determine the genuineness of the claim.25
§ 8. Confidentiality of Information Obtained Under a Demand
a. No documentary material, answers to written interrogatories, tran-
scripts of oral testimony, or any other information obtained under a demand
or a request for additional information may be disclosed to anyone other than
a duly authorized agent of the attorney general or the demand recipient, re-
spectively, without the consent of the person who produced such information.
b. Notwithstanding paragraph a. of this section, the appropriate court
may order the disclosure of any information obtained under a demand or re-
quest for good cause shown. The court may also place such limitations and
restrictions on such disclosure as it deems necessary.2"
c. Any person who discloses any information obtained under a demand
or a request for additional information other than by court order, or with the
consent of the person who produced such information, shall be [guilty of a
misdemeanor, or assessed a civil penalty of not more than [ ... ], or both].2 55
The person who disclosed the information shall also be liable to the injured
party for civil damages.
§ 9. Appearance of Counsel
Any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony may
be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel throughout the taking
of the testimony.2 "
§ 10. Time Periods
The time period for the performance of any act set forth in this Act may
be increased or decreased by the appropriate court for good cause shown.
§ 11. Fees and Mileage
Any person served with a demand compelling the giving of oral testi-
mony shall be paid fees and mileage on the same basis as is authorized to be
paid to witnesses in the courts of this state.25 7
§ 12. Service
a. Any demand authorized by this Act may be served upon any person
in the manner provided for by the rules of civil procedure for the courts of
this state.
b. Any request for additional information authorized by this Act may
be served upon the attorney general or his duly authorized agent in the fol-
lowing manner:
(1) by delivering a duly executed copy thereof to such person to
be served; or
(2) by depositing such copy in the United States mails by regis-
tered or certified mail, return receipt requested, duly addressed to such
person to be served.
253. See Part VI supra.
254. See Part VI supra.
255. Each state should here insert the appropriate criminal and/or civil penalty, and
the amount thereof.
256. See 15 U.S.C. § 1312(i)(7)(A) (1976).
257. See TzNN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-406. See generally Part VI supra.
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§ 13. Appeal of Final Orders
All final orders entered with regard to any demand or request for addi-
tional information may be appealed immediately as provided by the laws of
this state.
ANTHONY J. McFARLAND
